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1 Introduction
The modern growth literature considers human capital accumulation and research and develop-
ment (R&D) activity as two important engines of economic growth. Lucas (1988) shows how
accumulation of skills may explain long-term economic growth; the R&D-based growth literature
inspired by Romer (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991), Aghion and Howitt (1992) points out
the importance of knowledge or accumulation of ideas in the development of the economy.1 In
an interesting study on the source of the economic growth in United-States (US), Jones (2002)
confirms these views. He explains that 80 percent of US economic growth is due to increases in
human capital investment rates and research intensity while population growth accounts only
for 20 percent.
An important point about human capital is that it appears as a key ingredient to make
research. For instance, Nelson and Phelps (1966) explain that education facilitates adoption and
implementation of new technologies. In his seminal paper, Romer (1990) distinguishes clearly
unskilled labor from human capital and he insists on the key role of educated people to produce
innovations. The analysis of Benhabib and Spiegel (1994), based on the framework of Nelson
and Phelps, is an empirical support to this view. They explain that differences in growth rates
between two economies are essentially due to the gap in the available stocks of human capital in
these economies but not to the difference between the accumulation rates of human capital, as
it was suggested by Lucas (1988). Other empirical studies like Bartel and Lichtenberg (1987),
Goldin and Katz (1998) show a large degree of complementarity between the technical progress
and human capital. They find that a greater rate of technological progress increases the demand
of skilled workers relatively to unskilled ones. This observation deserves some attention to the
study of the interaction between the production processes of human capital and of knowledge.
In this paper, we consider an economy in which knowledge is produced using human capital
(as suggested above), but also in which human capital is itself produced using the knowledge
developed in the economy. That is to say, we specify an interdependence between research and
education activities. Moreover, the decisions to acquire skills and to innovate are endogenous.
The main reason to specify an interdependence between the two production processes comes
from the difficulty to dissociate the way to acquire skills from the way to produce knowledge. If
skilled workers benefit from a comparative advantage, relatively to unskilled workers, to produce
new technologies, it is at first because they have learned the knowledge developed by scientists
1Observe that the second wave of endogenous growth theory started with Judd (1985).
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or engineers. For example, we benefit today from the theory of Einstein on relativity. Since the
physician is dead, in order to improve his theory or to find a new one, it is necessary to produce
at first new physicians. Before to innovate, the future scientist must at first learn the theories
developed by Einstein (and others) to know what the state of knowledge is. Once the theory is
embodied in their brains (i.e. known), they may try and find how to improve it.
Our analysis can be related to a large literature developed for instance by Ziesemer (1990,
1991), Eicher (1996), Redding (1996), Arnold (1998), Blackburn, Hung and Pozzolo (2000),
Funke and Strulik (2000), Jones (1996, 2002). Ziesemer (1990, 1991) uses models in which
public factors (knowledge) are a key ingredient of the human capital formation. However, in his
1990 article, he assumes that knowledge is provided by the government i.e. there not a specific
R&D sector. In the 1991 paper, he considers a model with endogenous technological progress,
but he assumes the simultaneous contribution of the total quantity of human capital to the
production of the output and to the production of new units of knowledge. In contrast, in our
paper, the available quantity of human capital is endogenously shared between two sectors: one
part is used to innovate, the other one is devoted to the production of the consumption good.
Eicher (1996) uses an overlapping generation model in which the production of knowledge
is a by-product of education. Human capital is induced by requirement of absorbing new type
of technology, whereas new technologies needs human capital to be produced. In this context,
the interaction between human capital and knowledge both promote growth. However, the
assumption that innovations are by-product of education suppresses the incentives for research
activities.
Arnold (1998), Blackburn, Hung and Pozzolo (2000), Funke and Strulik (2000) extend the
analysis of Romer (1990) whereas Redding (1996) extends the one of Aghion and Howitt (1992).
These authors consider models in which both the decisions to acquire skills and to innovate
are endogenous. However, they do not account for any interaction between the knowledge
and the human capital production processes as it is done here. They analyze economies in
which innovations take place through a R&D activity using human capital and eventually the
existing stock of knowledge. But individuals increase their level of skill through a human capital
accumulation process as in the model of Lucas (1988). That is to say, human capital is a
necessary input to produce educated individuals but knowledge is not a production factor of
the education process. A common result of these authors is that human capital is essential to
sustain long-term growth but other knowledge is not. Indeed, long-term growth is possible even
if knowledge is not produced.
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Jones (1996) uses a similar framework to the previous ones, but he allows for a possible in-
teraction between the production of knowledge and the way to acquire skills. The author writes:
“the linearity of the human capital equation generates endogenous growth as in Lucas (1988).
However, the linearity of the human capital accumulation equation is then somewhat arbitrary,
and the endogenous growth arises from human capital accumulation, not from research” (see
pp. 10). The linearity of the production process of human capital is precisely the one studied
by Redding (1996), Arnold (1998), Blackburn, Hung and Pozzolo (2000), Funke and Strulik
(2000). Finally, Jones does not characterize neither the optimal allocation nor the decentralized
equilibrium one. He just makes an empirical analysis of the model.
Jones (2002) uses a model in which human capital is an input of the research activity but in
which knowledge is not necessary to educate people. Moreover, due to the chosen specifications
human capital does not appear as a key ingredient to sustain long-run per-capita growth.
Using the production technology for human capital developed by Ziesemer (1990, 1991),
our approach can be seen as an extension of Jones (2002) for two reasons: first, population
growth is a necessary condition to sustain per-capita long-term economic growth;2 second like
Jones (2002), we use a model without any intermediate goods production sector. This approach
simplifies greatly the analysis but at the time it asks the question of the funding of discoveries.
The author writes about his framework: “This can be viewed as a precursor to the richer analysis
that comes from adding markets to the model and analyzing equilibrium conditions as well as
technologies” (p. 223). Then, he suggests to characterize an equilibrium since he has just
performed an empirical analysis of his model. That is one of the main purposes of the present
paper.
Because of the public good nature of innovations, several problems arise. The first ones are
standard in economics literature: they are relative to the possibility to verify which agent uses a
discovery; they are linked to the possibility to exclude any agent that does not pay to access to
an innovation; they concern the problems of information about the willingness to pay of agents
to use an innovation.
The second type of problem comes from the non convexity of technologies using ideas as
productive factors. On this point, the replication argument states that there are constant
returns to scale with respect to private inputs and increasing returns to scale with respect to
both private and public inputs. As in a competitive market the payment of private factors fully
2Jones (1995a,), Kortum (1997), Segerstrom (1998), Howitt (1999) share also this property. We will discuss
about it later.
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exhaust revenue, firms are unable to pay for the public good they use.3 Thus, an equilibrium
with perfect competition on private goods markets does not exist if firms that pay to access to
innovations are not subsidized; this induces that imperfect competition is a necessary condition
to have an equilibrium in which firms, that pay to use innovations, are not subsidized.
We make the following assumptions: innovators can verify if a firm uses an innovation; they
can exclude it, if it does not pay to use the discovery; moreover, they have the information
about the willingness to pay to use the innovation. In other words, verifiability, excludability
and information are not problems in our model. On the other hand, we concentrate on the
problem raised by the non-convexity of technologies using knowledge as an input. In the standard
R&D-based literature, the assumption of perfect competition on all markets (except the one of
intermediate goods) is sustainable because the models induce equilibria with incomplete markets.
The goods sold to firms are intermediate goods which are private and divisible, embodying ideas.
However, innovations which are public, indivisible and durable goods are not priced.
In our economy, as there is not intermediate goods production sector, we must find an other
way to fund research. Jones (2003) proposes one particular type of decentralized equilibrium
in such a framework. However, he does not define any market nor any price for innovations.
The consequence of this drawback is that we do not know the price of an innovation in the
decentralized economy.4
Our approach is different and can be seen as a formalization of ideas already expressed by
economists like for instance Arrow (1962), Scotchmer (1991), Dasgupta et-al (1996). We con-
struct two equilibria with complete markets. That is to say, we define a market and we compute
the relevant prices for each good produced in the economy, and in particular for innovations.
In both equilibria, we assume that innovations are protected by intellectual property rights and
that innovators rent the discoveries they have produced to any potential user.
In the first equilibrium that we call the benchmark, we maintain the perfectly competitive
assumption on private goods markets. To avoid the problem of potential negative profits ex-
plained above, firms that use knowledge as a productive factor are subsidized by the government.
In that case, we show how to implement the optimum. In the second equilibrium, the govern-
ment does not intervene and knowledge is privately funded. To deal with the non-convexity of
3See for instance Manning et al (1985), Feehan (1989), Romer (1990), Jones (2003) for more details on this
point.
4An other drawback is that the shares of labor allocated to the different sectors of the economy are exogenously
given. In contrast, in the present analysis, they are endogenous. We compute their exact values as a functions of
the parameters of the model.
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production processes, we assume imperfect competition on markets using knowledge.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the model; Sections
3 characterizes the benchmark equilibrium; we account for an imperfect competitive equilibrium
in Section 4, and Section 5 concludes. Computations are provided in the Appendix, in Section
6.
2 The model
We consider a model in continuous time. The members or individuals of a representative house-
hold own unskilled labor (Lt) as an initial endowment and there are three production sectors.
An output sector produces a consumption good, Yt. A human capital production sector educates
people producing human capital, Ht. Throughout the paper, human capital is interpreted as the
general level of skill of individuals. And a R&D sector produces ideas or innovations whose total
stock, Nt, is interpreted as the available knowledge developed in the economy. The technologies
and the preferences of the agents are described in the following sub-sections.
2.1 Consumption good
The production function for the consumption good is given by
Yt = A (Nt)
β (LY t)
1−α (HY t)
α , (1)
where A > 0, α ∈ (0, 1) , and β > 0 are constant parameters; HY t and LY t are respectively the
quantity of skilled and unskilled labor employed; Nt is the available range of ideas developed in
the economy.5
The production function (1) displays constant returns to scale with respect to private inputs
and increasing returns with respect to all productive factors. Thus, for a constant stock of
knowledge Nt, if the quantities of skilled and unskilled labor are doubled the quantity of output
produced is doubled. The replication argument applies because ideas are non-rival goods: for
each scale of production private inputs are still combined with the same amount of knowledge.
5 It is possible to incorporate physical capital in the production process of the final good. In that case the
technology would be given by Yt = A (Nt)β (Kt)γ (HY t)α (LY t)1−γ−α . Nevertheless the main results remain
unchanged despite this modification.
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2.2 Human capital production process
The representative school or university uses unskilled labor, LHt, and all the stock of knowledge,
Nt, to produce skilled labor, Ht through the technology given by
Ht = φLHt (Nt)
ψ , (2)
where φ > 0, and ψ > 0 are constant parameters.
The technology (2) displays constant returns to scale with respect to unskilled labor and
increasing returns with respect to both unskilled labor and knowledge. As in the case of the
output sector, the replication argument applies because knowledge is a public good: doubling
the quantity of unskilled labor allocated to the educational sector doubles the quantity of human
capital produced in the economy.
The technology (2) is similar to the one used by Ziesemer (1990, 1991). The educative
activity (2) is the mean of transmission of knowledge across time. Indeed, it allows to transform
non educated people into skilled ones. Each time, the level of skills of individuals is updated by
latest discoveries. Once knowledge is embodied in people’s brains, they can try to innovate (see
equation (3)). Following Ziesemer (1990, 1991), human capital is treated as a flow to capture the
fact that skills are more difficult to make over than knowledge. Indeed, knowledge is a durable
good which can be inherited for example in written forms while the level of skill of an individual
is lost if he retires or dies. Then, complete depreciation of human capital is the simplest way to
account for this feature.
Our last remark concerns the parameter ψ which plays an important role in the specification
(2): we assume that a strictly positive value of ψ is required to educate people. Indeed, let us
consider the special case ψ = 0 and φ = 1: the educational sector transforms one unit of unskilled
labor into one unit of human capital, i.e. it simply relabels raw labor.6 In this case, knowledge is
not learned, which is not in accordance with the definition of human capital. Indeed, the human
capital of a person is composed of two distinct parts. The first one is the time or the quantity
of unskilled labor owned by the individual. By its nature, this component has a finite value.
The second one is the knowledge learned by the individual and which makes him skilled. Then,
when an individual supplies one unit of human capital, he supplies simultaneously raw labor
and knowledge.7 This is the knowledge embodied in the brain of the scientist, which makes him
6We thank one referee for this remark.
7Note that this is the reason why there is not any problem of appropriability with this good. In contrast with
knowledge, this is a private good. When a scientist works on a task, he cannot simultaneously work on an other
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skilled and which gives him the comparative advantage to innovate compared to an unskilled
worker.
2.3 Development of ideas
The R&D sector is composed of J firms. The number of discoveries achieved per unit of time
by the R&D firm j (j = 1, ..., J) , is given by
•
Njt = ξt (Hjt) (Nt)
γ , (3)
where γ < 1,
•
Njt is the arrival’s rate of ideas per unit of time and Hjt is the quantity of human
capital used to discover new ideas. The parameter ξt is taken as given by each firm. It measures
external effects in research and verifies ξt = δ (HRt)
θ−1 ; δ > 0 is a constant and exogenous
technological parameter; HRt =
PJ
j=1Hjt is the total quantity of human capital devoted to
research, and we assume θ > 0.8 One can note that if θ = 1, there is not any external effect in
research.
Summing over j, we see from (3) that the aggregate production function of knowledge in the
economy is given by
•
Nt = δ (HRt)
θ (Nt)
γ . (4)
According to the technologies (3) and (4) human capital is necessary to produce ideas but un-
skilled labor is not. This specification is made to capture the fact that only educated individuals
(scientists and researchers) can innovate.
The stock of knowledge, Nt, is a continuum of ideas, i, which take, for example, the form of
scientific reports. It can be the medical formula of a vaccine, the plan for a new car, ... In the
two equilibria we construct, the patented and priced goods are innovations, i ∈ [0, Nt] , which
are public, indivisible and durable goods (see later).
one.
8Authors like Jones (1995a, b), Arnold (1998), Blackburn, Hung and Pozzolo (2000), Kortum (1993) among
others assume that θ ∈ [0, 1]. Kortum estimates that θ belongs to the set [0.1, 0.6] supporting the assumption
of decreasing returns due to duplicative research. However, other authors indicate that the social rate of return
to R&D is larger than the private one, indicating positive spillovers. In the model, this induces that θ > 1. We
thank one referee for this remark.
8
2.4 Preferences and endowment
The economy is composed of an infinitely lived representative household whose members are
identical. Their number grows over-time at the exogenous rate gL > 0. Each individual is
initially endowed with one unit of unskilled labor, so that the total supply at time t is given
by Lt = L0egLt, where L0 represents the initial number of members at date 0. Preferences are
represented by the discounted utility function defined by
U (ct) =
∞Z
0
Lte−ρt
(ct)
1−ε − 1
1− ε dt, (5)
where ct is per-capita consumption at time t, ε > 0 is the inverse of the elasticity of substitution
and ρ > 0 is the rate of time preferences.
At each time, unskilled labor (Lt) is allocated between the human capital production sector
(LHt) in which individuals acquire their skills and the output sector (LY t). Then, the human
capital is devoted to the output sector (HY t) and to the R&D sector (HRt). The aggregate
constraints for unskilled labor and human capital are
Lt = LY t + LHt (6)
and Ht = HY t +HRt (7)
Remark: one can verify that R&D, human capital and population growth are three necessary
ingredients for per-capita long-term growth (see Appendix 6.1).
3 Equilibrium: the benchmark
The objective of this section is to construct an equilibrium in which the only distortions with
respect to the first best optimum comes from the externalities inside the R&D sector. We recall
that if θ = 1, these externalities disappear: then, the benchmark equilibrium is the first best
optimum.
In our economy, there are three private goods (the consumption good, Yt, unskilled labor,
Lt, human capital, Ht), and a continuum of public goods, i ∈ [0, Nt] , which are differentiated
and symmetric: the marginal productivities of two innovations are equal in a given sector where
they are used (see equations (1), (2), (3), (4)).
To construct this equilibrium, we assume that the markets of private goods are perfectly
competitive. In order to obtain an optimal production of innovations, we make the following
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two assumptions: first, innovators protect the discoveries they produce by an infinitely lived
intellectual property right (a patent); second, they are able to extract the willingness to pay
from each agent using innovations they have produced. Note that this practice implies that
different users pay different prices for the same good.
We can interpret such equilibrium as a formalization of ideas already expressed in the lit-
erature, for instance by Arrow (1962), Scotchmer (1991) and Dasgupta et al (1996). Arrow
(1962) and Scotchmer (1991) suggest that any user of a discovery must pay to use it. Arrow
(1962) writes: “Suppose, as the result of elaborate tests, some metal is discovered to have a
desirable property, say resistance to high heat. Then of course every use of the metal for which
this property is relevant would also use this information, and the user would be made to pay
for it. But, even more, if another inventor is stimulated to examine chemically related metals
for heat resistance, he is using the information already discovered and should pay for it in some
measure; and any beneficiary of his discoveries should also pay” (pp. 150). Scotchmer (1991)
explains that “a system of property rights that might seem natural would be to protect the first
innovator so broadly that licensing is required from all second generation innovators who use
the initial technology, whether in research or in production”. (pp. 32). Dasgupta et al (1996)
propose a strategy to construct such equilibrium. They write: “A possible scheme is for society
to grant intellectual property rights to private producers for their discoveries, and permit them
to charge (possibly differential) fees for their use by others. This creates private markets for
knowledge. Patent and copyright protections are means of enforcing intellectual property rights.
It is as well to note here that, in this scheme the producer (or owner) of a piece of information
should ideally set different prices for different buyers, because different buyers typically value
the information differently. In economics, these variegated prices are called Lindahl prices, in
honor of the person who provided the first articulation of this scheme” (pp. 10).9
There are two types of limits to this equilibrium. First, there are problems of identification,
exclusion and information that we do not treat in the present paper. Second, there are problems
of non-convexity. Indeed, the technologies using knowledge as a productive factor, display con-
stant returns to scale with respect to private factors and increasing returns to scale with respect
to both private and public inputs. As the markets for private goods are perfectly competitive,
their payment completely exhaust firms’ revenue. Thus, this induces the necessity of a subsidy
9We could consider other types of equilibria. For example, we could assume that each sector (Y , H, R&D) is
composed of several identical firms and there are three segmented and competitive markets for discoveries. The
prices obtained are also Lindahl prices. This result comes from the property of symmetry of innovations.
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(government intervention) to cover the willingnesses to pay of firms that use innovations. We
will discuss on the direct and private funding of research in Section 4.
To remove externalities in research, we assume the intervention of the government through
an economic policy tool, τ t, charged on R&D firms. This economic policy, as the subsidies to
the willingnesses to pay to use innovations, is funded through a lump-sum tax (or lump-sum
transfer), Tt, charged on (or given to) the representative household (see below).
The price of the consumption good is normalized to one (pY t = 1), the wage per unit of
unskilled labor, the wage of human capital and the rate of return on R&D investments are
respectively noted wt, qt and rt.
We denote by vY t, vHt and vjt (j = 1, ..., J) the willingnesses to pay of the consumption good
sector, of the human capital sector and of research firms to use an innovation at time t . Thus,
since there is perfect discrimination, vY t, vHt and vjt are the rental prices paid by these sectors
to use an innovation at date t. The total gain perceived by an innovator from the renting of an
innovation at time t is vt = vY t + vHt + vRt, where vRt =
PJ
j=1 vjt.
Note that the value of an innovation at date t is Vt =
R∞
t
vs.e−
R s
t
rududs. Differentiating the
expression of Vt with respect to time yields, rt = vt/Vt +
•
Vt/Vt. Now we proceed as follows:
we give the definition of the benchmark equilibrium in the economy described in Section 2; we
describe the behavior of each agent; we characterize the benchmark equilibrium.
Definition 1 A benchmark equilibrium is a set of temporal profiles of quantities ({Yt} , {Nt} ,
{LY t} , {LHt} , {HY t} , {Hjt}j=1,...,J) and of prices ({wt} , {qt} , {rt} , {vY t} , {vHt} , {vjt}j=1,...,J),
for t ∈ [0,∞[ , such that:
• firms maximize their profits;
• the representative household maximizes its utility;
• markets of private goods (Y , L, H) clear at each date t;
• vY t, vHt and vjt are respectively the willingnesses to pay (rental prices) of the output sector,
of the educational sector and of R&D firms to use an innovation.
3.1 Behavior of agents
a) The output sector chooses the quantities of skilled and unskilled labor that maximize its
profit given by ΠY t = Yt − qtHY t − wtLY t, where Yt = A (Nt)β (LY t)1−α (HY t)α . Solving this
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problem yields the following first order conditions,
qt = αYt/HY t, (8)
wt = (1− α)Yt/LY t. (9)
The willingness to pay to use an innovation at time t is
vY t = ∂ΠY t/∂Nt = βYt/Nt. (10)
Remark: it is possible to disaggregate the sector in K firms, (k = 1, ...,K), sharing the same
technology Ykt = A (Nt)
β (Lkt)
1−α (Hkt)
α . The profit of firm k is Πkt = Ykt− qtHkt−wtLkt and
the first order conditions are qt = αYkt/Hkt, and wt = αYkt/Lkt.
The willingness to pay of firm k to use an innovation at time t is vkt = ∂Πkt/∂Nt = βYkt/Nt.
Note that different firms (i.e. firms with different output Ykt) pay different rental prices to use
an innovation. However, the key point is that the total willingness to pay of the whole sector is
unchanged. Indeed, we have vY t =
PK
k=1 vkt = βYt/Nt (see equation (10)). This result justifies
that we use a representative firm, despite the presence of public goods and increasing returns to
scale.
b) The representative school of the educational sector chooses the quantity of unskilled labor
that maximizes its profit ΠHt = qtHt−wtLHt, where Ht = φLHt (Nt)ψ . The first order condition
of this program is
wt = qtHt/LHt. (11)
The willingness to pay to use an innovation at time t is
vHt = ∂ΠHt/∂Nt = ψqtHt/Nt. (12)
Remark: as before, we could disaggregate this sector; the result would be the same.
c) The firm j maximizes the sum of the present values of its expected profits given byR∞
0 [vtNjt − (1 + τ t) qtHjt]e
−
R t
0 rududt, subject to the technology (3). Associating the costate
variable νt to the law of motion of ideas in the firm j, the Hamiltonian of this problem is
Γ = [vtNjt − (1 + τ t) qtHjt] e−
R t
0 rudu + νtδ (HRt)
θ−1Hjt (Nt)
γ
The first order conditions are: ∂Γ/∂Hjt = νtδ (HRt)θ−1 (Nt)γ − (1 + τ t) qte−
R t
0 rudu = 0 (a),
and ∂Γ/∂Njt = −
•
νt = vt.e−
R t
0 rudu (b). Integrating (b) between t and infinity, we obtain
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R∞
t
− •νsds =
R∞
t
vs.e−
R s
0 rududs =
³
e−
R t
0 rudu
´
.
R∞
t
vs.e−
R s
t
rududs. Note that the transversality
condition lim
t→∞
νtNjt = 0 implies ν∞ = 0 because Njt > 0 for all t. Therefore, we have νt =
Vt.e−
R t
0 rudu, where Vt =
R∞
t
vs.e−
R s
t
rududs (see above). Using the expression of νt, (a) becomes
Vtδ (HRt)
θ−1 (Nt)
γ = (1 + τ t) qt. Multiplying both sides by HRt and using (4), we get
•
NtVt = (1 + τ t) qtHRt. (13)
The willingness to pay at time 0 to use an innovation at time t is ∂Γ/∂Nt = νtγδ (HRt)θ−1Hjt (Nt)γ−1.
Multiplying both sides by e
R t
0 rudu, one gets the willingness to pay at time t for an innovation
used at t, that is to say vjt = Vtγδ (HRt)
θ−1Hjt (Nt)
γ−1 . Thus, the willingness to pay at time t
to use an innovation at t by all firms of the R&D sector is
vRt =
XJ
j=1
vjt = Vtγδ (HRt)
θ (Nt)
γ−1 . (14)
d) We assume that the budget constraint of the government is balanced at each time; it is
given by
Tt = vtNt − τ tqtHRt. (15)
vtNt is the total subsidy given to sectors that rent innovations at date t, and τ tqtHRt represents
the tax charged (or the subsidy given) to research firms.
e) The representative household maximizes (5) subject to the budget constraint
•
bt = rtbt +
Ltwt−Ltct−Tt, where bt = NtVt.10 Solving this program, we obtain the standard Keynes-Ramsey
rule,
εgc + ρ = rt. (16)
3.2 Characterization of the benchmark equilibrium
Here we study the steady-state equilibrium paths and we analyze the effects of variations of the
value of the economic policy tool on the equilibrium quantities of labor allocated to the different
sectors. Since we focus only on a balanced growth path, the time subscript can be omitted in
the policy tool τ, which must be constant in this case.
10 In fact, this constraint is the reduced form of
•
bt = rtbt + wtLY t + qtHt − (qtHt − wtLHt) − Ltct − Tt. In
this expression, the household sells his raw labor, LHt, to the educational sector and buys the human capital,
Ht, that he resells to the consumption good and R&D sectors: the first qtHt is the revenue from these sectors;
(qtHt −wtLHt) is the net payment to the educational sector.
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Given the agents’ behavior, we can determine the growth rates of the variables in the economy
and compute the shares of labor allocated to the different sectors as a function of the rate of tax
(τ) charged on R&D firms. Proposition 1 summarizes the results and describes the equilibrium
paths we obtain in the economy as a function of τ . Equilibrium values are denoted with a
subscript “e”. The growth rate of any variable x is noted gx. The proof of the proposition is
provided in Appendix 6.2.
Proposition 1 The benchmark equilibrium balanced growth path with perfect competition on
private goods markets and innovations rewarded at their Lindahl price levels, is characterized by
constant growth rates verifying,
geH =
1− γ
1− γ − θψgL > gL,
geN =
θ
1− γ − θψgL =
θ
1− γ g
e
H ,
gec = g
e
Y − gL =
θ (β + αψ)
1− γ − θψgL = [β + αψ] g
e
N ,
constant shares of skilled labor allocated to the R&D sector and to the final sector,µ
HRt
Ht
¶e
= (β + αψ)
·
α (ε− 1) (1 + τ t)
gc
gN
+
α (ρ− gL) (1 + τ t)
gN
+ αθ (1 + τ t)
gH
gN
+ β
¸−1
,
µ
HY t
Ht
¶e
= 1−
µ
HRt
Ht
¶e
,
and constant shares of unskilled labor allocated to the educational sector and to the final sector,µ
Lt
LHt
¶e
=
1
α
− (1− α)
α
µ
HRt
Ht
¶e
,
µ
LY t
Lt
¶e
= 1−
µ
LHt
Lt
¶e
.
The prices are given by: qet = αYt/HY t; w
e
t = (1− α)Yt/LY t; ret = εgec + ρ; veY t = βYt/Nt;
veHt = ψqtHt/Nt; v
e
Rt = γg
e
NV
e
t , where V
e
t =
R∞
t
ves.e
−
R s
t
reududs. Finally, the following equality
must be satisfied: (wt/qt)
e = (1− α)HY t/LY t = αHt/LHt.
First of all, note that from Proposition 1 it is possible to compute the growth rates of prices.
Moreover, the necessary condition for the existence of a balanced growth path is 1−γ−θψ < 1.
Note that the term γ measures the degree of the knowledge spill-over effect in research; the
term θψ reflects the interaction between knowledge and human capital. As discussed previously,
human capital acts as a mean to transmit knowledge over-time. On the one hand, when a new
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innovation is produced, it helps researchers to produce new ones (see equation (3) and (4)).
On the other hand, as Nt grows researchers become more productive because the quantity of
knowledge embodied in their brain is higher (see equation (2)).
The condition 1− γ− θψ < 1 means simply that the global marginal productivity of knowl-
edge in research is decreasing. Indeed, the term γ + θψ of our framework corresponds to the
parameter φ of the model of Jones (1995a, b) in which the aggregate production of ideas is given
by,
•
N t = δ (LRt)
λ (Nt)
φ : LRt is the quantity of raw labor allocated to research; λ ∈ ]0, 1] mea-
sures the external effect in research; φ < 1 allows past discoveries to either increase (φ > 0) or
decrease (φ < 0) current research productivity. With our specification incorporating education
of individuals, one can compute that the elasticity of production of new ideas with respect to
the stock of knowledge is equal to γ + θψ, while it is equal to φ in the paper of Jones.
The growth rate of population appears as a necessary condition to sustain a strictly positive
per-capita long-run growth rate. This result may appear puzzling. The growth rate of the output
per-capita in countries that have a high fertility rate is not necessarily higher than the one of the
countries in which the growth rate of population is lower. Nevertheless, as pointed out by Jones
(1995a), if we consider growth in the world economy, this result is plausible. In that case, the
stock of knowledge must be interpreted as a stock of ideas that can be used everywhere around
the world. Following Jones, we must think to this type of model as relating to the growth in the
effective number of researchers, which does not necessarily requires population growth as whole.
Proposition 1 states the equilibrium is characterized by constant shares of skilled and un-
skilled labor allocated to the different sectors. Since population grows at exogenous rate gL > 0,
this means that skilled workers and thus the number of scientists in R&D grow at rate gL. The
main difference with Jones (1995a) is that individuals must be educated to conduct research
projects. Each time, they increase their productivity. Indeed, through the educational process
(2), the total level of skills in the economy grows over-time according to gH = gL + ψgN > gL.
Thus the total quantity of human capital in the economy grows because both the population
and the stock of knowledge increase simultaneously. This result differs from Jones’ (2002) model
in which human capital grows at the same rate than population. In the present framework, for a
given amount of knowledge a larger number of people educate themselves. In that sense, human
capital increases at first because gL > 0. Then, the level of skills increases because each time
individuals update their productivity through learning. In that case, the growth rate of produc-
tivity of skilled workers is measured by the term ψgN . To sum up, the economy we describe is
characterized by an increasing number of better skilled scientists who conduct research projects.
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Scientists are better skilled because an increasing amount of knowledge is embodied in their
brain.
In a seminal paper, Jones (1995a) raises the question of scale effects’ prediction of R&D-
based models for which the level of the long-run growth rate is proportional to the number of
scientists engaged in research: in these studies, a permanent increase of resources allocated to
research induces a faster economic growth. Against this property, the author argues that the
number of researchers in United-States has grown over-time from 200.000 in 1950 to nearly one
million at the end of the 80’s. At the same time either the per-capita growth rates remained
approximately constant or their average declined. As a consequence, long-term economic growth
has not accelerated despite the increasing level of employment in research.
Our model is consistent with these observations: as seen above, in our economy the number
of scientists increases over-time; then, one can remark that growth rates are independent from
any scale effects. As Jones points out, “scale effects are replaced by an intuitive dependence on
the growth rate of the labor force rather than on its level” (see Jones 1995a, p. 768). Finally, one
can remark that long-term growth rates depend on parameters considered as invariant to any
economic policies. According to Jones (1995b), Arnold (1998), Blackburn, Hung and Pozzolo
(2000) for instance, this result seems consistent with empirical regularities since subsidy to
research do not seem to induce any long-run impact on growth rates of advanced economies.
Simultaneously to the dramatic increase in the number of scientists engaged in research,
one can observe the fairly constant ratio R&D expenditures over gross domestic product, for
instance at 2.5% in United-States. Let us show that this empirical fact is taken into account
in our model at steady-state. The total expenditures in R&D, (ER&D), is given by ER&D =
qtHRt (1 + τ t) + vRtNt. Using equations (13) and (14), one gets ER&D = VtNtgN (1 + γ) . At
steady-state, differentiating this expression with respect to time, yields gER&D = gV + gN = gY .
This, implies that ER&D/Yt is constant over-time along a balanced growth path.
Now let us study the effects of variations of the tax rate on the equilibrium shares of labor
(skilled and unskilled). We compute easily that ∂ (HRt/Ht)
e /∂τ < 0 and ∂ (LHt/Lt)
e /∂τ < 0.
Therefore, as the value of the tax rate increases, R&D firms reduces the skilled labor’s share they
employ. Due to the interaction between knowledge and human capital, this behavior induces the
decrease of the rate of innovation in the economy. As a consequence, it becomes less interesting
for schools to employ unskilled labor, which explains the decline of LHt/Lt.
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3.3 Optimal taxation
The aim of this sub-section is to compute the value of the economic policy tool charged on
R&D firms that implements the optimum. Indeed, for each possible value of τ corresponds a
particular equilibrium (see Proposition 1), and only one is optimal; this equilibrium is the first
best optimum. Before to characterize it, it is necessary to compute the optimal balanced growth
path. The problem of a benevolent and informed social planner is to maximize (5) subject to
(1) to (4) and (6)-(7).
Solving the above problem, we obtain the optimal growth rates of the variables in the econ-
omy (which are identical to the decentralized equilibrium ones) and the optimal shares of labor
allocated to the different sectors. The computations are gathered in Appendix 6.3. Then,
comparing the results of the optimum and of the benchmark equilibrium we may obtain the
proposition 2 given below. To distinguish the case in which the government intervenes to re-
move externalities in research (first best optimum) from the one in which it does not, we adopt
the following notation: the sign “o” is used for optimal values while the sign “∗” is used for the
cases in which externalities remain in the benchmark equilibrium.
Proposition 2 If the government chooses τo = 1/θ − 1, the benchmark equilibrium path is
optimal.
If there is not any externality in research (i.e. if θ = 1), it is not necessary to use an eco-
nomic policy tool to implement the optimal balanced growth path. The benchmark equilibrium
coincides with the optimum; in this case, the value of the policy tool is zero, τo = 0. In the
other cases, the government must intervene. If θ < 1 (resp. θ > 1), the policy tool is a tax-rate
(resp. a subsidy-rate) charged on R&D firms.
If τ = 0 and θ < 1 (resp. θ > 1), one can compute that (HRt/Ht)
∗ − (HRt/Ht)o > 0 (resp.
(HRt/Ht)
∗−(HRt/Ht)o < 0 ) and (LHt/Lt)∗−(LHt/Lt)o > 0 (resp. (LHt/Lt)∗−(LHt/Lt)o < 0).
The reason is the following: R&D firms do not account for the externalities in research; if θ < 1
(resp. θ > 1), without any intervention of the government, research firms are attempted to hire
an excessive (resp. an insufficient) amount of human capital in order to innovate; this induces
that the number of innovations produced per unit of time is higher (resp. lower) than in the case
of the optimum; because of the interaction between the human capital and the R&D processes,
it becomes more (resp. less) interesting for schools to educate individuals.
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4 Equilibrium with imperfect competition
The aim of this section is to present an equilibrium in which research is privately funded. In other
words, the government does not intervene to subsidy the willingnesses to pay for innovations. As
discussed earlier, one difficulty to account for such equilibrium comes from the non-convexity of
technologies using knowledge as an input. To deal with this property, we consider an equilibrium
in which there is imperfect competition on markets that use ideas as productive factors. In the
present paper this situation prevails on the markets of output, human capital and innovations.
To construct the equilibrium, we assume that imperfect competition leads to two conditions.
First, the profits including both the payment of private factors and the reward of innovators are
nil. This condition can be interpreted as a free entry condition on the markets. Second, each
firm uses the amounts of inputs so that the marginal rate of substitution between two productive
factors equals the ratio of their market prices. This behavior underlines the fact that firms are
price takers on the markets of inputs.
To simplify the analysis, we assume that the government does not intervene neither to remove
the external effect in research nor to subsidy the willingness to pay of firms to use discoveries.
After giving the definition of the equilibrium with imperfect competition, we proceed to its
characterization. Notations are identical to the ones used in the previous section.
Definition 2 An equilibrium with imperfect competition is a set of temporal profiles of quantities
({Yt} , {Nt} , {LY t} , {LHt} , {HY t} , {Hjt}j=1,...,J) and of prices ({wt} , {qt} , {rt} , {vY t} ,
{vHt} , {vjt}j=1,...,J), for t ∈ [0,∞[ , such that:
• all firms minimize their costs (i.e. the marginal rates of substitution of two factors are
equal to the corresponding prices ratios);
• all profits are nil;
• the representative household maximizes its utility;
• markets of private goods (Y , L, H) clear at each date t;
• vY t, vHt and vjt (j = 1, ..., J) are respectively the rental prices paid by the output sector,
the educational sector, and R&D firms to use an innovation.
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a) For the output sector, the program Min. qtHY t + wtLY t + vY tNt subject to Yt =
A (Nt)
β (LY t)
1−α (HY t)
α , yields
(1− α)
α
HY t
LY t
=
wt
qt
, (17)
(1− α)
β
Nt
LY t
=
wt
vY t
, (18)
α
β
Nt
HY t
=
qt
vY t
. (19)
Moreover, we have ΠY t = A (Nt)β (LY t)1−α (HY t)α − qtHY t −wtLY t − vY tNt = 0.
b) For the school of the educational sector, the relationship between the marginal rate of
substitution of labor and knowledge with the prices ratio is given by
Nt
ψLHt
=
wt
vHt
. (20)
The zero profit condition is: ΠHt = qtφLHt (Nt)ψ −wtLHt − vHtNt = 0.
c) Let us consider the research firm j.At each time t, the minimization of the cost qtHjt+vjtNt
subject to
•
Njt = ξt (Hjt) (Nt)
γ leads to
Nt
γHjt
=
qt
vjt
. (21)
The free entry condition implies that, at each date t, the value of the stock of innovations is equal
to the sum of the present values of the expected profits. That is to say,
R∞
t
[vsNjs−qsHjs−vjsNs].
e−
R s
t
rududs − VtNjt = 0 for all t.We can give a simpler expression of this condition. Let us con-
sider the integral I =
R∞
t
Vs
•
Njse−
R s
t
rududs, where Vs =
R∞
s
vx.e−
R x
s
rududx (see above). One gets
I =
R∞
t
•
Njs
hR∞
s
vx.e−
R x
t
rududx
i
ds. Integrating by parts yields I =
h
Njs
R∞
s
vx.e−
R x
t
rududx
i∞
t
+R∞
t
Njsvs.e−
R s
t
rududs. By assuming lim
t→∞
NjtVt = 0 (see the corresponding transversality condi-
tion in the case of the benchmark equilibrium), one gets I = −NjtVt +
R∞
t
Njsvs.e−
R s
t
rududs.
Therefore, one has Z ∞
t
[vsNjs − qsHjs − vjsNs] e−
R s
t
rududs− VtNjt
=
Z ∞
t
µ •
NjsVs − qsHjs − vjsNs
¶
.e−
R s
t
rududs = 0, for all t,
that implies Vt
•
Njt − qtHjt − vjtNt = 0, for all t.
d) The behavior of the household is the same than in the previous section.
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Now, we characterize the steady-state. Given the new equilibrium conditions for the con-
sumption good sector, for the educational sector, and for research firms, we can determine the
growth rates of the variables in the economy and compute the shares of labor allocated to the
different sectors. Proposition 3 summarizes the results obtained. Values are denoted with a
subscript “ic”. The proof of the proposition is gathered in Appendix 6.4.
Proposition 3 An equilibrium balanced growth path with imperfect competition is characterized
by constant growth rates identical to the ones of the benchmark equilibrium (see proposition 1),
constant shares of skilled labor allocated to the R&D sector and to the final sector,µ
HRt
Ht
¶ic
=
(1 + γ) (1 + ψ)
β (1 + ψ) + αψ
·
α (ε− 1) gc
gN
+
α (ρ− gL)
gN
+ αθ
gH
gN
+
αγ2
(1 + γ)
+
β
(1 + γ)
¸−1
,
µ
HY t
Ht
¶ic
= 1−
µ
HRt
Ht
¶ic
,
and constant shares of unskilled labor allocated to the educational sector and to the final sector,µ
Lt
LHt
¶ic
=
(1− α) (1 + ψ)
α
"
1−
µ
HRt
Ht
¶ic#
+ 1,
µ
LY t
Lt
¶ic
= 1−
µ
LHt
Lt
¶ic
.
The prices are given by: qict = αYt/ [(1 + β)HY t]; w
ic
t = (1− α)Yt/ [(1 + β)LY t]; rict = εgc + ρ,
where gc is given in Proposition 1; vicY t = βYt/ [(1 + β)Nt]; v
ic
Ht = ψqtHt/ [(1 + ψ)Nt]; v
ic
jt =
γV ict
•
Njt/ [(1 + γ)Nt] , where V ict =
R∞
t
vics .e
−
R s
t
ricu duds. Finally, the following equality must be
satisfied (wt/qt)
ic = (1− α)HY t/ [αLY t] = ψHt/ [(1 + ψ)LHt] .
As previously in proposition 1 one can compute the growth rates of prices and one can find
that the values are identical in the two types of equilibria. However, except for the rate of return
on R&D investment, we observe that for any given Yt, HY t, LY t, HRt, LHt, and Nt, imperfect
competition leads to a decrease in the level of prices. The level of wage of unskilled labor is pro-
portionally more affected than the wage of human capital since (wt/qt)
ic = ψHt/ [(1 + ψ)LHt] <
(wt/qt)
∗ = Ht/LHt. Note that the prices of factors (unskilled labor, skilled labor and ideas) are
lower than their marginal productivities: that explains why profits are not negative despite the
properties of increasing returns to scale.
Concerning the shares of skilled and unskilled labor allocated to the final sector, to research
and to education along the imperfect competitive equilibrium path, we can remark that they dif-
fer slightly comparing to the benchmark equilibrium. If we compare (HRt/Ht)
ic with (HRt/Ht)
o
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and (LHt/Lt)
ic with (LHt/Lt)
o, we remark that imperfect competition can lead either to an
excessive or to an insufficient allocation of resources in research and in education. This result
is closed to the one of Jones and Williams (2000) who use a model incorporating intermediate
goods.
5 Conclusion
This paper incorporates a R&D sector and a human capital production process so that both
activity appears equally essential to sustain the per-capita long-run economic growth. In our
economy, only scientists and engineers are able to produce innovations which are used at school
to educate individuals. This analysis is consistent with several empirical regularities discussed
in the relevant literature on endogenous growth: the per-capita growth rate does not exhibit
scale effects and it is unaffected in the long run by economic policies. In the economy we
describe, there is not any intermediate goods production sector. This specification simplifies
the model but it raises the question of the funding of research. As an answer, we construct two
equilibria in which the users of discoveries reward directly innovators; these equilibria can be
interpreted as a formalization of concepts expressed by Arrow (1962), Dasgupta et al (1996) and
Scotchmer (1991). In the first one, there is perfect competition on the markets of private goods
and innovators which own a patent on their discoveries, are able to extract the willingness to
pay from each agent using their innovations.
agents who use them. That is to say, each firm pays the maximum rental price it is willing to
pay to use an innovation. Due to the non-convexity of technologies using innovations as produc-
tive factors, the willingnesses to pay (rental prices) of firms are subsidized by the government.
In this case, we show how to implement an optimal balanced growth path by using a single
economic policy tool charged on R&D firms, to remove externalities in this sector.
In the second equilibrium we construct, research is privately funded. We treat the problem
of increasing returns to scale by assuming imperfect competition on markets whose technologies
use knowledge as a productive factor. In that case, we present a methodology to characterize
this equilibrium. Except for the rate of return on R&D investment which keeps the same value
in the two equilibria, we find that the level of prices is lower in the imperfectly competitive case.
However, their growth rates remain unchanged.
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6 Appendix
6.1 R&D, Human capital and population growth: three necessary ingredients
for per-capita long-term growth
Case 1 R&D is necessary. Let us assume that δ = 0 in the production process (4). This implies
that
•
Nt = 0, then gN = 0. There is not any creation of new units of knowledge. In that case,
according to the educational process (2) we get gH = gL. According to the technology (1) we have
gc + gL = βgN + αgH + (1− α) gL. As gN = 0 and gH = gL, we have gc = 0.
Case 2 Human capital is necessary. Let us assume that φ = 0 in the production process (2).
Then Ht = HY t = HRt = 0, which implies
•
Nt = 0 and gN = 0. One can assume that LHt = 0
(i.e. LY t = Lt) and Yt = A (Nt)
β Lt (the replication argument with respect to the private good
unskilled labor, Lt, still applies). In that case, gY = gL, and since gY = gc + gL, the per-capita
long-run growth rate is nil: gc = 0.
Case 3 Population growth is necessary. From equation (4), at steady-state, one gets gN =
δ (HRt)
θ (Nt)
γ−1 . Since gN is constant, we obtain θgHR = (1− γ) gN , for all t. Let us assume
that gL = 0. Then, we have gLY = gLH = gL = 0, and equation (2) implies that gH = ψgN . Using
the fact that gHR = gH at steady-state, we have (1− γ − θψ) gN = 0. Since (1− γ − θψ) < 0 is
a necessary condition for a balanced growth path to exist, we deduce that gN = 0 and gH = 0.
Therefore Yt = A (Nt)
β (LY t)
1−α (HY t)
α is constant over-time, and the per-capita long-term
growth is nil: gc = 0.
6.2 Characterization of the benchmark equilibrium
We focus on balanced growth paths. Thus, the levels of the growth rates and of the policy tool
are constant. Using the fact that rt = vt/Vt+
•
Vt/Vt with (16) yields εgc+ ρ = vt/Vt+
•
Vt/Vt (a).
Equations (10), (12) and (14) yield:
vt/Vt = gN {βHt/ [α (1 + τ t)HRt]− β/ [α (1 + τ t)] + ψHt/ [(1 + τ t)HRt] + γ} (b), which im-
plies gHY = gHR = gH at steady-state. Differentiating (13) with respect to time yields:
•
Vt/Vt =
gq+(1− θ) gH−γgN . Differentiating (8) with respect to time yields: gq = gY −gH .Combining the
two previous results with the fact that gY = gc+gL yields
•
Vt/Vt = gc+gL−θgH−γgN (c). Using
(a), (b) and (c) we get εgc+ρ = gN {βHt/ [α (1 + τ t)HRt]− β/ [α (1 + τ t)] + ψHt/ [(1 + τ t)HRt] + γ}+
gc + gL − θgH − γgN . Then, we can determine HRt/Ht as function of gc, gN and gH . After com-
putations, we get
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µ
HRt
Ht
¶e
= (β + αψ)
·
α (ε− 1) (1 + τ t)
gc
gN
+
α (ρ− gL) (1 + τ t)
gN
+ αθ (1 + τ t)
gH
gN
+ β
¸−1
Now we compute the growth rates of the variables of the economy. Using the technology (4)
we get gN = θgH/ (1− γ) . Using the technology (2) we obtain gH = gL+ψgN , therefore we have
gN = θgL/ (1− γ − θψ) and gH = (1− γ) gL/ (1− γ − θψ) . Using the technology (1), we get
gc+gL = βgN+αgH+(1− α) gL which implies gc = θ (β + αψ) gL/ (1− γ − θψ) = (β + αψ) gN .
A necessary condition for the existence of a balanced growth path to exist is 1−γ− θψ > 0.We
can deduce easily the value of HY t/Ht. The shares of unskilled labor allocated to the educational
sector and to the output sector are found by using (8), (9) and (11).
6.3 Characterization of the Optimum
The Hamiltonian of the social planner’s problem is given by,
Γ = Lte−ρt
(ct)
1−ε − 1
1− ε + λt
h
A (Nt)
β (LY t)
1−α (HY t)
α − Ltct
i
+µtδ (HRt)
θ (Nt)
γ + νt
h
φLHt (Nt)
ψ −HY t −HRt
i
+ ξt [Lt − LY t −LHt]
The first order conditions can be written as λt = e−ρtc−εt (a), νt = λtαYt/HY t (b), ξt =
λt (1− α)Yt/LY t (c), νt = µtδθ (HRt)θ−1 (Nt)γ (d), ξt = νtφ (Nt)ψ (e), −
•
µt = λtβYt/Nt +
νtψHt/Nt + µtγgN (f). Since Yt = Ltct, we get immediately gc = gY − gL. Differentiating
equations (a), (b) and (d) with respect to time, we can obtain, (ε− 1) gc+ρ−gL = (1− θ) gHR−
gHY − γgN −
•
µt/µt (g). Differentiating the production function one can obtain gY = gc + gL =
βgN + (1− α) gLY + αgHY (h). Then, using (b), (c), (d), (f) with the human capital constraint
we get after computations, − •µt/µt = θgN [(β + αψ)Ht/ (αHRt)− β/α+ γ/θ] (i). Equations
(g) and (i) imply that along a balanced growth path gHY = gHR = gH . Thus it follows that
gLY = gLH = gL. One can obtain the values of the growth rates of the variables in the economy
which are exactly the same than in the case of the benchmark equilibrium. Combining (g), (h)
and (i) we get after computations the optimal share of labor allocated to research:µ
HRt
Ht
¶o
= (β + αψ)
·
α (ε− 1)
θ
gc
gN
+
α (ρ− gL)
θgN
+
αgH
gN
+ β
¸−1
The other results can be deduced.
23
6.4 Characterization of the equilibrium with imperfect competition
For each agent of each sector, we combine the two types of conditions given in the text (zero profit
condition and equality between the marginal rate of substitution between two factors with their
corresponding prices ratio) to find: Yt/HY t = (1 + β) qt/α (a), Yt/LY t = (1 + β)wt/ (1− α)
(b), Yt/Nt = (1 + β) vY t/β (c) for the output sector; qtHt/LHt = (1 + ψ)wt (d), qtHt/Nt =
vHt (1 + ψ) /ψ (e) for the school of the educational sector; qt = VtgN/ (1 + γ) (f) and vRt =
γVtgN/ (1 + γ) (g) for the research sector.
Remark: the price of inputs in imperfect competition are lower than their marginal produc-
tivity.
One can remark that equations (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), (g) resemble to equations (8), (9),
(10), (11), (12), (13), (14) of the previous section. The method of resolution is exactly the same
than in the previous section. One finds that εgc+ ρ = vt/Vt+
•
Vt/Vt (h). Equations (a), (c), (e),
(f) and (g) yield:
vt/Vt = gN {βHY t/ [αHRt] + ψHt/ [(1 + ψ)HRt] + γ} / (1 + γ) (i) which implies gHY = gHR =
gH at steady-state. Differentiating (f) with respect to time yields:
•
Vt/Vt = gq+(1− θ) gH−γgN .
Differentiating (a) with respect to time yields: gq = gY −gH . Combining the two previous results
with the fact that gY = gc + gL yields
•
Vt/Vt = gc + gL − θgH − γgN (j). Using (h), (i) and (j)
we get εgc + ρ = gN {βHY t/ [αHRt] + ψHt/ [(1 + ψ)HRt] + γ} / (1 + γ) + gc + gL − θgH − γgN .
Then, we can determine HRt/Ht as function of gc, gN and gH . After computations, we get
µ
HRt
Ht
¶ic
=
(1 + γ) (1 + ψ)
β (1 + ψ) + αψ
·
α (ε− 1) gc
gN
+
α (ρ− gL)
gN
+ αθ
gH
gN
+
αγ2
(1 + γ)
+
β
(1 + γ)
¸−1
The growth rates are the same than in the benchmark equilibrium.
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